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INTRODUCTION

Daniel Berman ("Berman"), a finance director for Neo@Ogilvy LLC ("Neo"),'
was shocked to find himself terminated after simply doing his job and complying
with the law. Berman's primary responsibility at Neo was to ensure that Neo's
accounting was executed in compliance with Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles ("GAAP"); 2 Berman was also responsible for tracking the internal
accounting procedures of Neo. ' When Berman discovered that Neo was
committing accounting fraud, he spoke up.4
Berman went to a senior officer at the company to report the violations that he
was concerned about.s Not only did Berman believe the practices violated GAAP,
but he also thought that they violated both the Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank
Acts,' both of which have the general purposes of preventing fraudulent activity
and promoting transparency in the financial system. Shortly after reporting the
alleged violations, his senior officer became angry with him. As a result, Berman
was terminated.7

Retaliation against whistleblowers is prohibited under the Sarbanes-Oxley and
the Dodd-Frank Acts.' These anti-retaliation provisions are set out to encourage
those who are aware of securities laws violations to come forward and bring the
problems to light. Unfortunately for Berman, however, he did not report the
potential violations to the Securities and Exchange Commission.' Because of this
fatal error, Berman was not afforded the anti-retaliation protections. o This
resolution of this apparent dichotomy is the heart of this Note, which advocates for
courts to reach an outcome contrary to that in Berman's initial case.
In 2013, the Fifth Circuit held in Asadi v. G.E. Energy US., LLC that the
anti-retaliation protections applied only to those individuals who reported directly
to the Securities and Exchange Commission.n Shortly after the Asadi case
'Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 148 (2d Cir. 2015).
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) are a set of accounting principles,
standards, and procedures used by companies in preparing their financialrecords. GAAP is prepared by
the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). There is a taxonomy published by FASB every year
with
regard
to
current
GAAP.
The
2016
version
can
be
found
at
http://www.fasb.org/cs/ContentServer?c=Page&pagename=FASB%2FPage%2FSectionPage&cid=1176
164335312 [https://perma.cc/H437-WCJ8].
Berman, 801 F.3d at 149 (2d Cir. 2015).
2 The

4
5

Id
Id.

6 Id.
7

Id.
' See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 802 (2002) (codified at 15
U.S.C. 7201); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376, 1744 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C § 78u-6(21F)).
9
Berman, 801 F.3d at 149.
o Luckily for Berman, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's decision to deny him the
protection of the anti-retaliation provisions. Id. at 155. This case is discussed in detail later in this paper.
See infra Section I.B.
" Asadi v. G.E. Energy (U.S.A.), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 630 (5th Cir. 2013).
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concluded, Berman filed suit against Neo in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York for violating the whistleblower protection
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act.12 Now, more nearly two years later, the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that Berman may still have a chance."
The Second Circuit, unlike the Fifth Circuit, found that the provisions were
ambiguous and conflicting-enough to provide Chevron deference 14 to the
reasonable interpretation of the Securities and Exchange Commission in Berman v.
Neo@OgilvyLLC.`
This Note seeks to discuss the two circuit courts' discussions of the statute and
the reason for the courts' different interpretations. Part I provides an analysis on
the courts' reasoning, including which canons of statutory interpretation the courts
used as bases to arrive at their differing conclusions. Part II analyzes different
statutory interpretation arguments, both textual and substantive, and evaluates
which arguments are beneficial for each circuit's outcome. Part III examines the
policy arguments behind the Dodd-Frank Act and the implications of both circuits'
outcomes. Part IV provides a recommendation for future courts to utilize when the
issue arises.
I. FIGHTING OVER STATUTORY INTERPRETATIONS:
WHY THE ASADIAND BERMANCOURTS DISAGREED

The issue that created this circuit split is a question of interpreting two different
sections within the anti-retaliation provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. The purpose of the Dodd-Frank
Act is both to provide greater transparency in the financial system of the United
States as well as to provide consumer protection against fraudulent or abusive acts."
The statute makes the word "whistleblower" a defined term: "The term
'whistleblower' means any individual who provides .. . information relating to a
violation of the securities laws to the Commission, in a manner established, by rule
or regulation, by the Commission." " Later in the same statute, there is a
prohibition against retaliation by employers:
No employer may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass,
directly or indirectly, or in any other manner discriminate
against, a whistleblower in the terms and conditions of
See Berman, 801 F.3d at 149.
See id. at 155.
14 Chevron deference occurs when a court grants deference to the relevant government agency's
interpretation of a statute. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
5See id. at 153, 155.
16
Wal
Street
Reform:
The
Dodd-Frank
Act,
WHITEHOUSE.GOV,
https-//www.whitehouse.gov/economy/middle-class/dodd-frank-wal-street-reform
[https://perma.cc/6KJT-2JLC] (last visited Oct. 31, 2016).
17 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2016) (emphasis added).
1

'
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employment because of any lawful act done by the
whistleblower(i) in providing information to the Commission in
accordance with this section;
(ii) in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any
investigation or judicial or administrative action of the
Commission based upon or related to such information; or
(iii) in making disclosures that are required or protected
under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.),
this chapter, including section 78j-1(m) of this title, section
1 5 13(e) of title 18, and any other law, rule, or regulation subject
to the jurisdiction of the Commission."
Subsection (iii) of the anti-retaliation provision is where the heart of the dispute
lies. This particular section cross-references the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(enacted to protect investors and shareholders from fraudulent practices"), which
contains provisions requiring individuals who are aware of potential securities laws
violations to report them internally to the company before reporting them to the
Securities and Exchange Commission. 20
The Fifth and Second Circuits are the only two circuits that have ruled on this
particular statutory interpretation issue. On the other hand, since the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 was passed, multiple
district courts have attempted to interpret the statute and determine how the
different sections relate. 21 The trend in the district courts is to include those
individuals who have reported only internally as "whistleblowers" under the
statutory definition, and therefore allow those internal reporters to receive the
benefit of the anti-retaliation protection provisions under the Dodd-Frank Act.'
The Securities and Exchange Commission issued a rule before either circuit
court made its decision as an attempt to clarify the interpretation of the statute.23
Only one of the circuit courts, however, chose to use the Commission's

1s
9

Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A).
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 15 U.S.C.

7201).
71 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2016). There are also provisions in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that contain antiretaliation protections for employees who report to someone "with supervisory authority over the
employee." See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(C) (2016).
21 Although only two circuits have ruled on this issue, many district courts are familiar with it. See,
e g., Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 3d 640, 644-46 (E.D. Wis. 2014) (following the
Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the statute and holding that a whistleblower is required to report
violations to the Securities and Exchange Commission in order to receive protection); Ellington v.
Giacoumakis, 977 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D. Mass. 2013) (holding that the statute is sufficiently
ambiguous to warrant Chevron deference to the Securities and Exchange Commission's rule).
22 See, e.g., Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 986, 993-94 (M.D. Tenn.
2012); Genberg v. Porter, 935 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1106-07 (D. Colo. 2013).
217 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2 (2012) (defining whistleblower).

2o16-20oy7
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24

interpretation: the Berman court. While the Asad court read the statute sections
as compatible, 25 the Berman court found that there was sufficient ambiguity to
warrant deference under Chevron to the related governmental agency, here, the
Securities and Exchange Commission. 26
The next two Subsections of this Note will analyze each court's decision,
focusing primarily on each court's reading of the statute, along with whether or not
the courts included reference to the purpose of the statute or the policy behind it.
A. 'PerceivedConfict"notPresent with Plain LanguageReading:
The Fifth CircuitHolds that Reporting to the Securities and
Exchange Commission is Vital
In 2013, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed the Dodd-Frank Act's
plain language and affirmed the district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim
under Rule 12(b)(6) because the plaintiff-appellant did not fall within the
definition of "whistleblower" under the Act. 27 The plaintiff-appellant, Khaled
Asadi, was an executive for G.E. Energy in Amman, Jordan.2 8In 2010, about four
years after he began working for G.E. Energy, Asadi received a tip that G.E.
Energy had hired someone that was associated with an Iraqi official in order to
successfully negotiate a joint venture agreement. 29 Asadi reported this information
to his supervisor because he was concerned that it violated the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act.3 o Shortly after he reported the suspicious activity, the company began
to retaliate against him.' The company pressured him to step down and gave him
"surprisingly negative" performance reviews. 2 Within one year of reporting the
suspicious activity to his supervisor, G.E. Energy fired him.33
Asadi brought the claim against G.E. Energy, alleging that the company
violated the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of

24

See Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 155 (2d Cir. 2015).
L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 629-30 (5th Cir. 2013).

a SeeAsadi v. G.E. Energy (U.S.A.),
a See Berman, 801 F.3d at 155.
27
2

Asadi, 720 F.3d at 621.

3

Id

2 Id.

' Id. One of the purposes of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) is to prevent bribery of
foreign officials. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: An Overview, U.S. DEPT. JUST.,
[https://perma.cc/X8BG-54YR]
https-//www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/foreign-corrupt-practices-act
(last updated July 20, 2016). Violations of the FCPA may lead to charges by the Securities and
Exchange Commission. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2016). Interestingly, G.E. Energy later settled a FCPA
claim. Marcus Baram, GeneralElectric Whistleblower Says He Was Firedfor Raising ConcernsAbout
2012),
8,
(Feb.
POST
HUFFINGTON
Corruption,
Potential
http://www.huffsngtonpost.com/2012/02/08/general-electric-whistleblower-n_1262207.htm
[https://perma.cc/TK5B-SBAW]. It is unknown whether or not the claim was related to the violation
that Asadi reported. See id.
31 Asadi, 720 F.3d at 621.
32
d
33

Id
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2010.34 The question before the Fifth Circuit was "whether an individual who is
not a 'whistleblower' under the statutory definition of that term in § 78u-6(a)(6)
may, in some circumstances, nevertheless seek relief under the whistleblowerprotection provision."3s

The court's analysis focused exclusively on the text of the Dodd-Frank Act
statute.16 The court also set forth the principles of statutory interpretation that were
relevant to the case, effectively reminding the reader that the statutory language is
more important than the policy argument behind the language." Specifically, the
court noted a few important principles. First, if statutory text is "plain and
unambiguous," it must be applied "according to its terms."M To determine if the
text is plain and unambiguous, the court must reference "the language itself, the
specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the
statute as a whole."3 1 Second, the court should give effect "to every word and every
provision Congress used."' Finally, provisions of a statute should be read to be
"compatible, not contradictory."41
According to the court, the text in § 78u-6(a)(6) is express and unambiguous in
limiting the protection to whistleblowers as defined-those who provide
information to the Securities and Exchange Commission only.42 Although Asadi
conceded that he did not fit expressly within that definition because he only
reported the information internally, he argued that the section regarding
whistleblower protection conflicts with the section regarding the definition of a
whistleblower.43 He based his argument on the fact that an individual can take
actions that are protected under § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) but still fail to qualify as a
"whistleblower" as defined in § 78u-6(a)(6) if the individual does not report the
information to the Commission."
Subsection (h) of § 78u-6 is titled "Protection of whistleblowers."" Under this
subsection, there is a paragraph regarding prohibition against retaliation." This
paragraph contains language that, according to Asadi, conflicts with the definition
as given by 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6).4 7 This language states that an employer may
not retaliate against a whistleblower that makes "disclosures that are required or
protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002."48
3 Id.
3

at 623.
at 623 ("We start and end our analysis with the text of the relevant statute . .
3 See id. at 622.
31 Id. (quoting Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379,-387 (2009)).
Id. (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)).
4 Id. (citing Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)).
41 Id. (citing FDA v. Brown &Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)).
42 Id. at 623.
4 Id. at 624.
4 Id.
4515 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h) (2016).
4 Id.
4 Asadi, 720 F.3d at 624-25.
48 § 78u-6(h).
.

1Id.
36 Id.

2016-2017
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Asadi's argument was based on the fact that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
contains anti-retaliation provisions that extend protections not only to those who
report information to the Securities and Exchange Commission, but also to those
who report information internally to a supervisor within the individual's company.4 9
Further, Asadi argued that if § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) was considered to apply only to
those who report to the Commission, it would effectively render the words "to the
Commission" superfluous in the definition section.5 0
Denying Asadi's argument, the court ruled that reading the statute in the way
Asadi suggested would render "the [Sarbanes-Oxley Act] anti-retaliation provision,
for practical purposes, moot." s1 In particular, the court noted the differences

between the Dodd-Frank Act and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and why they should
not be treated the same, even though they may have similar objectives. 52 In the end,
the court effectively stated that the Dodd-Frank Act is a better option than the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act for an individual with knowledge of a potential violation
seeking whistleblower protections.5 3
The differences that the court points out are significant. First, the court
recognizes that the anti-retaliation provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act provide the
individual greater monetary damages than the similar provisions in the SarbanesOxley Act.54 Specifically, the Dodd-Frank Act allows for two times the monetary
damages that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act allows for.5 Second, the steps an individual
must take before filing an anti-retaliation claim under the Dodd-Frank Act are
more numerous for those bringing a claim under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 5
Individuals bringing a claim under the Dodd-Frank Act may bring a claim without
filing a claim to a federal agency, but individuals bringing a claim under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act must file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor
beforehand." Finally, the statute of limitations is longer for the Dodd-Frank Act
58
whistleblower claims than it is for the Sarbanes-Oxley Act whistleblower claims.
In fact, the Dodd-Frank Act's statute of limitations is at least five and a half years
59
longer than the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's statute of limitations.
The differences in the statutes of limitations and allowances for monetary
damages are particularly significant. An individual wishing to bring an antiretaliation claim clearly would rather bring their claim under the Dodd-Frank Act
because of the benefits of higher damages, but the court in Asadi argues that these
differences are present to encourage an individual with information to report to the
49

Asadi, 720 F.3d at 624-26.
so ld. at 628.
51
d.
52
13
1

55

5

id.

See id. at 628-29.
Id. at 629.

Id

6 See id.

57
58
51

Id.

Id

l U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(iii) (2016), iwith 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(D) (2016).
Compare 15
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Securities and Exchange Commission, not just internally to the company that he or
she works for.'
In fact, the court's argument was that the "perceived conflict" between the two
sections, § 78u-6(a)(6) and § 78u(6)(h)(1)(A)(iii), were actually not in conflict at
all.6' The court proposed a hypothetical situation in which a mid-level manager of a
company becomes suspicious of a securities law violation.62 Upon discovery of the
situation, the manager reports the information to two entities: (1) the company's
chief executive officer and (2) the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Immediately after reporting it, the manager is fired by the chief executive officer.'
The court notes that the chief executive officer may not be aware that the manager
reported it to the Commission right away; the implication being that the chief
executive officer may not realize he or she may be liable under the Dodd-Frank or
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 65 Because the manager reported the information to the
Commission, he is considered a "whistleblower" under the statutory definition in
the Dodd-Frank Act.' But, according to the court, the manager "would be unable
to prove that he was retaliated against because of the report to the SEC," because
the chief executive officer was not aware of the report to the Commission. 6
Therefore, he would not be protected under the first and second category of
protected activity in the Dodd-Frank Act, because the retaliation would not be as a
result of reporting the potential violation to the Commission. He would, however,
be protected under the third category of protected activities because he made a
disclosure that was required or protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act by
reporting the information internally to his chief executive officer."
This hypothetical is one of the reasons for disagreement cited by the circuit
court that later split from the Fifth Circuit's holding.
B. "SufflcientAmbiguity"when ConsideringSuperfluous Language and
Legislative Intent: The Second CircuitSplits with the Fifth and
Holds thatInternalReportingis Enough
Two years after the Asadi decision, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held
that an individual does not have to report information to the Securities and
Exchange Commission in order to be considered a "whistleblower" under the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, as long as the
individual reports the information internally to the company he or she works for. 69
SeeAsadi, 720 F.3d at 623.
Id. at 625.
6 Id. at 627.
6 Id.
64
6
61

Id.

See id. at 627-28.
* Id. at 627.
67 Id.
61 Id. at 627-28; 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)
(2016).
69 Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145,
155 (2d Cir. 2015).
6s

-2016-2o17
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These two circuits are the only two to rule on this particular question, although
district courts are divided on how to interpret the statute.7 1
Plaintiff-appellant Berman was a director at Neo starting in 2010.71 His

responsibilities included reporting the company's financial information and
ensuring that both the company's and its parent corporation's internal accounting
procedures complied with GAAP. 72 While employed at the company, Berman
discovered multiple accounting practices that he believed were not in compliance
with GAAP and therefore constituted accounting fraud. 7 He reported the
violations internally to a senior officer, but he did not report any violations to the
Securities and Exchange Commission (while he was employed at the company-he
later informed the Commission, but it was after the statute of limitations had run
for Dodd-Frank Act claims).74 Berman was terminated.7 5
The district court ruled that § 21F(h)(1)(A)(iii) provided protection only to
individuals who were considered whistleblowers under the statute-those who
report alleged violations to the Commission. 76 Therefore, the district court
dismissed Berman's Dodd-Frank claims because he had been terminated before lie
77
reported the alleged violations to the Commission.
The Second Circuit reversed the decision of the district court." The appeals
court recognized that its decision was going to create a circuit split, but noted that a
larger number of district courts have held that the statute is sufficiently ambiguous
enough to allow deference to the relevant agency, the Securities and Exchange
Commission: "Thus, although our decision creates a circuit split, it does so against
79
a landscape of existing disagreement among a large number of district courts."
Unlike those in Asad, the judges in Berman were not in agreement on the
holding. Here, the dissenting judge agreed with the opinion from Asadi, arguing
that an individual should not be afforded Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation protections
unless he or she reports the information to the Commission.so A brief discussion of
this dissent's reasoning will follow the analysis of the majority opinion.
As mentioned earlier, the majority in Berman was not convinced by the
hypothetical situation proposed in Asadi. Here, the court noted that the "possibility
of simultaneous complaints" was the main idea in persuading the Asadi court that
the definition of whistleblower could be considered consistent with the protected
situations in Dodd-Frank." In fact, the court was able to articulate multiple
70 See supra note

20 and accompanying text.

71 Berman, 801 F.3d at 148.
72

Id. at 148-49.
* Id. at 149.
7
Id.
n Id.
76I.

Id. at 155.
Id. at 153.
Se id. at 155-60 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
sI Id. at 151.
7

79
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reasons as to why this reading of the statute would give the provision "extremely
limited scope"-which serves as an argument as to why there is ambiguity among
the sections of the statute.8 2

The most important discussion that the Berman court makes is that of whether
Chevron deference should be given in this statutory interpretation. The
determination of whether Chevron deference applies is a two-step process. First,
the court must consider if there is an "unambiguously expressed intent of Congress"
with regard to "the precise question at issue."' Second, if the statute is either
ambiguous or silent, the court must consider if the relevant agency's interpretation
is "based on a permissible construction of the statute."84
The Berman court noted a few cases in which the court did not apply express
terms because it "yielded a result so unlikely to have been intended by Congress
that the Supreme Court did not apply those terms."ss Berman noted the most
recently decided case of King v. Burwefi, in which the Supreme Court interpreted a
statute that stated "established by a state" to mean "established by the State or the
Federal Government." 86 Also, it conceded that if an employee were to
simultaneously report potential securities law violations to both his or her employer
internally and to the Securities and Exchange Commission, the employee would be
eligible for both Dodd-Frank and Sarbanes-Oxley anti-retaliation protection
remedies, so there is no absolute conflict between the definition statute and the
protection statute. 8 But, lack of conflict will exist only in extremely rare
circumstances, leaving protection of the third category of acts with exceedingly
limited scope."
First, the court voiced a concern for the individuals who are put in the situation
of discovering a wrongdoing. When an individual discovers the information, he or
she is put in a difficult situation-to do the right thing and potentially risk losing
his or her job, or to stay silent and keep his or her job. This sentiment is expressed
by the court's recognition that an individual may believe that reporting the
information to only his or her employer carries less risk than reporting to a
government agency, namely the Securities and Exchange Commission." Since the
enactment of new whistleblower rules in August 2011, the amount of tips received
by the Commission from whistleblowers has increased- by more than thirty

82 Id.

a Chevron U.S.A.

Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
8 Id. at 843.
" Berman, 801 F.3d at 150 (citing Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 472
(1892)).
6 Berman, 801 F.3d at 150 (quoting King v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 2490, 2496 (2015)).
" Berman, 801 F.3d at 150. The court admits that there is no absolute conflict; instead, it rests its
argument on the fact that this lack of conflict exists only in very rare situations. Id. at 152.
" Id. at 151.
9
Id.

20-2017
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percent." This conveys the overall trend that employees will report if they believe
that they will be protected against retaliation from their employers.
Next, the court argued that the most significant impact of reading the statute as
the Asadi court suggests is that particular categories of whistleblowers will not be
protected by the statute, even if they wish to report the information to the
Commission." Particularly, auditors and attorneys will not necessarily be able to
obtain "whistleblower" status as the Asadi court describes. 92
This will surely send a chill up most attorneys' spines. Under both SarbanesOxley provisions and the Commission's Standards of Professional Conduct,
attorneys of public companies must report potential securities law violations to
either the chief legal counsel or chief executive officer of the company before taking
further action.' If the chief legal counsel or chief executive officer does not act on
the information and respond accordingly, the concerned attorney then must report
94
the potential violation to an audit committee or the board of directors. Only after
this internal reporting is done can an attorney then bring the information to the
Commission. 9 The justification for requiring this internal reporting before
allowing the attorney to report to the Commission is that it preserves client
confidentiality and protects information. 96 Although confidentiality may be
preserved, the attorney's job might not be. Retaliation would likely happen well
before the attorney had the opportunity to report the information to the
Commission, as the process requirements before reporting to the Commission
leave management ample time to make decisions with regard to the attorney's
employment.
Similar to attorneys, auditors of public companies are required under SarbanesOxley to "inform the appropriate level of management" when they believe they
have discovered illegal activity, with a few exceptions." If, after reporting to the
management, there is no remedial action taken, the auditor must report the
information to the board of directors of the company." Only after the board or the
management fails to take remedial action may the auditor report the illegal activity
to the Commission." Berman emphasizes the lack of simultaneity that these
requirements will cause between reporting the discovered information internally
and to the Commission and explains that an auditor would likely not be afforded

90 SEC, 2015 ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS ON DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 1,

https-//www.sec.gov/whisdeblower/reportspubs/annual-reports/owb-annual-report[bttps://perma.cc/JBU4-WJS8].
91 Berman, 801 F.3d at 151-52.
92 Id. at 151.
9

Id. at 151-52; see also 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2016).

94

Berman, 801 F.3d at 152.

9 Id.

Id.

Id. at 151 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(b)(1)(B)).
9 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(b)(1)(B)).
99
Id.
9

2

015.pdf
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Dodd-Frank protection, and, more importantly, would likely be retaliated against
before the issue could be reported to the Commission.'
Because the court found the effect of the reporting requirement "sharply
limiting," the Berman court, unlike the Asadi court, attempted to evaluate
legislative history to ascertain legislative intent.' 0 ' Unfortunately, there is little in
the way of legislative history because the particular section was not included in the
version of Dodd-Frank that was passed prior to a conference.' 02 There is, however,
one note from the House Conference Report in 2009 about enhancing incentives
for whistleblowers: "The subtitle further enhances incentives and protections for
whistleblowers providing information leading to successful SEC enforcement
actions."'03
Finally, the court discussed the superfluous nature of the differences between
the two requirements. 104 It also notes what legislative realities may bring:
All these arguments ignore the realities of the legislative process.
When conferees are hastily trying to reconcile House and Senate
bills, each of which number hundreds of pages, and someone
succeeds in inserting a new provision like subdivision (iii) into
subsection 21F(h)(1)(A), it is not at all surprising that no one
noticed that the new subdivision and the definition of
"whistleblower" do not fit together neatly. The definition speaks
of reporting to the Commission, but subdivision (iii) incorporates
Sarbanes-Oxley provisions, which contemplate
internal
reporting, without reporting to the Commission. Subdivisions (i)
and (ii), which were included in the Senate version of DoddFrank before the conferees met, fit precisely with the
"whistleblower" definition. Subdivision (i) explicitly requires
reporting "to the Commission," and subdivision (ii) concerns
assisting action "of the Commission," whereas the terms of
subdivision (iii) do neither."os
This discussion led the court to determine that the conferees that were the last to
accept the insertion of the particular subdivision would not have expected it to have
the extremely limited scope that it currently has according to the Asadi ruling.'
Based on this discussion, the court held that the sections were sufficiently
ambiguous, and therefore gave Chevron deference to the relevant agency. 0 7 That
100Id.
101 Id. at 152.
102

I

103 H.R. REP. No. 111-517, at 870 (2010)).
10 Berman, 801 F.3d at 153-54.

ios1 Id. at 154 (internal footnotes omitted).
o' Id. at 155.

107 Id
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agency, in this situation, was the Securities and Exchange Commission."as Because
the Commission had already given an interpretive ruling on that matter, the court
adopted that rule, allowing Berman to be protected under the Dodd-Frank Act."o
II. APPEARANCES CAN BE DECEIVING: ALTHOUGH PLAIN LANGUAGE
SEEMS CLEAR, A DEEPER LOOK AT CONTEXT REVEALS
CONFLICTS AND LIMITATIONS

A. The Plain LanguageMeaning of the Statute:
"To the Commission'Means "To the Commission"
As mentioned earlier, the Asadi court primarily focused on what most Supreme
Court decisions do: the plain language meaning of the statute at issue. 10 If the
statute is unambiguous, then the "first canon [of statutory interpretation] is also the
last: 'judicial inquiry is complete.""'" In order to understand the meaning of the
statute at issue, the court should look at the statute as a whole.1 12 This approach
was followed by Justice Scalia: "Statutory construction, however, is a holistic
endeavor. A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by
the remainder of the statutory scheme . . . because only one of the permissible

.

meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.
"113

If, for example, a statute defines a specific word in a definitions section, that
definition controls when used in the rest of the statute.114 In Colautti v. Franklin,
the appellants argued that the term "viable" was synonymous with "may be viable"
in a statute regarding abortion."s The court rejected this argument, however,
stating that because the word "viable" was defined in the statute, the definition
given was intended to be the sole meaning of the word when used in the other
provisions of the statute: "[T]he suggestion that 'may be viable' is an explication of
the meaning 'viable' flies in the face of the fact that the statute .

.

. already defines

'viable.' This, presumably, was intended to be the exclusive definition of 'viable'
throughout the Act." 1
Similarly to Colautti, in Asadi and Berman, the term at issue, "whistleblower,"
is a defined term within the statute.' 1 7 The plain language of the definition of
10 Id.
no Asadi v. G.E. Energy (U.S.A.), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 625 (5th Cir. 2013).
n' Conn. Nat? Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) (quoting Rubin v. United States,
449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981)).
"I See, e.g., Maimonides Med. Ctr. v. United States, 54 F. Supp. 3d 194,203 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).
113 United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (internal
citations omitted).
114 Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392-93 (1979).
11

d.

Id. at 392 (emphasis added).
117 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2016).
116

KENTUCKY LAWJOURNAL

406

Vol. 105

"whistleblower" indicates that in order to be considered an individual within the
defined term, that individual must report the information to the Commission.'
Both individuals seeking whistleblower protection in Asadi and Berman argued
that the term also includes individuals who report the information internally."' As
in Colautti, the suggestion that "to the Commission" means "to the Commission or
internally to the company" "flies in the face" of the fact that the statute expressly
defines the term "whistleblower" to not include "internally to the company."' 20
Based on the Colauttianalysis alone, it would seem as though the Asadi court was
correct in holding that individuals who reported violations solely internally within
the company were not protected by the anti-retaliation provisions in the DoddFrank Act. Yet, there is a unique difference from Colautti the term defined in
Asadi and Berman is used in a way that would give the statute extremely limited
scope.
B The PlainLanguageMeaningis NecessarilyAmbiguous,"Leaving the Statute
With ConfictingProvisionsandExtremely Limited Scope
According to Judge Learned Hand, the court must always "remember that
statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish," instead of focusing just
on the pure definition of a word.' 2 ' Looking at the plain language strictly in terms
of the defined term of "whistleblower" as analyzed above disregards the fact that
the provision does not further the purpose the statute sought to accomplishencouraging individuals with knowledge of securities laws violations to come
forward and to disclose the potential violations.
When interpreting statutes, the court should construe the statute so that "effect
is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void,
or insignificant . . . ."122 Although a term that is used throughout a statute is
generally given the same definition each time it appears, this presumption "readily
yields whenever there is such variation in the connection in which the words are
used as reasonably to warrant the conclusion that they were employed in different
parts of the act with different intent." 123 If the plain language interpretation
produces an "absurd result," then it should be rejected.1 24

u's

Id.

119 See Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 621 (5th Cir. 2013); Berman v.
Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 147 (2d Cir. 2015).
120 Colautti, 439 U.S. at 392. There is, however, a small difference between the term at issue in
Asadi and Berman versus that in Colautti. In Colautti, the term at issue was the term defined, not part
of the definition of a term. Id. at 392-93. In Asadi and Berman, the term at issue is "to the
Commission" within the definition of"whistleblower." See supra text accompanying notes 49-50, 79.
121 Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945).
m Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (quoting 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06 (rev. 6th ed. 2000)).
m Ad. Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932).
124 See, e.g., United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 47-48 n.5 (1994).
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The Supreme Court has seen a case before in which, although the statutory
definition seemed to expressly give an exclusive meaning to a word, the plain
meaning ended up being overcome because of the ambiguous application to use in
the rest of the statute. In Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., the term at issue was the word
"employee," which was defined in the statute as "an individual employed by an
employer."' 2 5 Even though the term was expressly defined in the statute, as in
Culoutti, the court questioned whether it should be applied in different sections of
the statute due to various uses of the word.'" While the word "employee" is used
consistently with the unambiguous express definition in some sections, other
sections dearly use the word "employee" to mean something more inclusive than
just an employee currently employed by the employer.1 27 For example, two sections
use the term to discuss current employees, involving different standards of
compensation for "employees who work in different locations,"1 28 and establishing
plans "to provide a maximum opportunity for employees to advance so as to
perform at their highest potential."1 29 On the other hand, other sections use the
30
term to discuss former employees, "reinstatement or hiring of employees,"o and
employees aggrieved by the final disposition of their complaint being eligible to file
1
a civil action.13

The court held that the term was ambiguous because of the difference in
meanings between the different sections:
But those examples at most demonstrate that the term
"employees" may have a plain meaning in the context of a
particular section-not that the term has the same meaning in all
other sections and in all other contexts. Once it is established
that the term "employees" includes former employees in some
sections, but not in others, the term standing alone is necessarily
ambiguous and each section must be analyzed to determine
whether the context gives the term a further meaning that would
resolve the issue in dispute. 32
The court solved the ambiguity by looking at the other sections of the statute, the
position taken by the relevant agency, and the "primary purpose of the
antiretaliation [sic] provisions: Maintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial
mechanisms."1 33 Based on these factors, the court held that the term "employees"

125

6

Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 342 (1997) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1997)).
I at 341-42.
Id.

-3 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1997).
1 Id. § 2000e-16(b).
"o Robinson, 519 U.S. at 342; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1).

13142 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c).
132

Robinson, 519 U.S. at 343-44.

133

Id. at 345-46.
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included both former and current employees, even though the definition seemed to
include only current employees when looked at using the plain language
interpretation of the statute.134
Robinson is nearly on point with the issue in Asadi and Bernan. The definition
in the Dodd-Frank Act seems to give an express definition of the word
"whistleblower" by including the term "to the Commission. "'3 Admittedly, the
plain language of the definition seems to indicate that an individual must report
potential securities laws violations to the Securities and Exchange Commission in
order to be afforded the protection of the anti-retaliation provisions, as discussed
above."' Nevertheless, like Robinson, some sections of the statute do not seem to
fit with that limited definition-specifically, subsection (iii) of the anti-retaliation
provisions. 13' The subsection requires that the definition of whistleblower be
extended to individuals who report violations internally to the company as well."3
Analogous to Robinson, since the term seems to include different individuals in
some sections than others, the term is "necessarily ambiguous."
III. SUFFICIENT AMBIGUITY WARRANTS NOT ONLY CHEVRONDEFERENCE TO
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, BUT ALSO TO POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS ACCORDING TO ROBINsoN

The next step in determining the definition of "whistleblower" according to
Robinson should be to consider not only the relevant agency's position on the
matter, but also the primary purpose of the anti-retaliation provisions.' For the
relevant agency position, the Berman court was correct in looking to the Securities
and Exchange Commission for guidance on the interpretation of the statute.

A. Deference to the Securities and Exchange Commission: SufficientAmbguity
Allows the Commission'sRulng to Take Effect
According to Robinson, if the statute is found to be "necessarily ambiguous,"
the court may analyze each section "to determine whether the context gives the
term a further meaning that would resolve the issue in dispute."' Furthermore, if
there is not an "unambiguously expressed intent of Congress . . . [on] the precise
question at issue," then the statute is sufficiently ambiguous enough to warrant
deference to the relevant agency's interpretation under Chevron.4 1

L1 Id. at 346.
131 See 15 U.S.C.
36

§ 78u-6(h)(1).
' Seeid.
137 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) (2016).
13 8
Id.

" See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 346.
140 Id. at 343-44.
141 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Counsel, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).

021-7
20 201t

1-~A~.

IAJItrl.AJI/

C

1ATb;~tl~1-J,,.rpr~
409
A~itblw

P~-.4-;,-.r,~
JnhflJJi~JViJt~, ItL~.t. LJAJIAO J*JI VV~±±.fl±~.'~'.'

F.nzyxuv1"5
--

.

409

"

This method is the same that the Berman court followed, looking to the
Securities and Exchange Commission's recent rule speaking to the exact statute in
question.1 After contradictory rulings by federal district courts, the Commission
promulgated a rule in 2011 under the agency's authority attempting to provide
guidance for future conflict on interpretation of the statute. The Commission's
Rule 21F-2(b)(1) states that an individual who reports potential securities laws
violations internally to the company is also protected under the Dodd-Frank Act's
43
anti-retaliation provisions, even though the individual did not report to the SEC.'
This is the rule that the Berman court followed based on its finding that the statute
was sufficiently ambiguous to warrant Chevron deference. 1
In the future, courts should follow the advice of the Robinson court and the
actions of the Berman court and give deference to the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Based on Rule 21F-2(b)(1), courts should hold that the Dodd-Frank
Act does afford protections to those individuals who report potential violations
internally to the company.
B. Why PolicyMatters: KeepingMarket IntegrityPost-EnronScandal by
Encouraging Whistleblowers to Come Forwardwith Information
The Asadi court explicitly focused on interpreting the statute using the statute's
plain language. 14 5 Although it briefly mentioned the purpose of the statute itself, it
did not analyze the legislative intent behind the statute. In fact, the court never
mentioned the fact that the particular sub-subsection in question, § 78u6(h)(1)(A)(iii), was added on a different draft than the two previous subsubsections.'"
On the other hand, the Berman court looked at more than just the plain
language of the statute. As noted above, the particular subsection in question was
added on a different draft than the other two sub-subsections. 47 The Berman court
noted this and explained that there is little to no legislative history as to why this
was later added.148 Because there is no legislative history referencing the particular
subsection, the court inferred that the addition was likely the product of legislative
bundling.1 49 It is not unlikely that the problem the cross-referenced subsection
posed was merely overlooked in the passage of the statute. Without an in-depth
look at what the anti-retaliation provisions in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act specifically
stated, it would easily seem to be consistent with the definition of "whistleblower"
set forth in 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(a)(6).
SeeBerman v. Neo@OgilvyL.L.C., 801 F.3d 145,155 (2d Cir. 2015).
(2016).
144 Berman, 801 F.3d at 155.
145 Asadi v. G.E. Energy (U.S.A.), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 623 (5th Cir. 2013).
This fact, however, was mentioned by the Berman court. See Berman, 801 F.3d at 152-53.
14 7
d
148 Id. at 152.
142

1-3 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)(1)

49

1

See id
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This recognizes the practical effects of legislation and what happens as a bill is
developed. When an additional subsection is added, the legislature may not
necessarily go back to ensure that it does not conflict with other subsections in a
large statute. The Berman court cited this as the reason for the discrepancy
between the statutory definition and the statutory protections provided by DoddFrank.'s While the majority in Berman allows this interpretation to carry the day,
the dissent argues otherwise. The dissent notes that this is an assumption that the
majority is making, not necessarily a fact. 1s Further, the dissent notes that because
there is no legislative history, there is no way for the majority to cite this as the
reasoning.1 52
Analyzing the congressional intent when interpreting a statute provides the
court justification behind the statute. Furthermore, using legislative history allows
the court to read into the policy arguments surrounding Congress' passing of the
statute. In fact, the policy arguments behind including those who report internally
under the anti-retaliation provisions help prove that Berman provided the correct
outcome.
In this particular situation, the policy behind the statute is unduly important.
The financial disasters of the early 2000s left the public with little confidence in the
accountability of large publicly held companies. With millions of dollars of
shareholder value lost and thousands of jobs gone, the financial industry needed
reformation. Both the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Dodd-Frank Act are aimed at
increasing accountability and transparency in the financial industry, with specific
sections aimed at encouraging those who work at these large, publicly held firms to
report suspicious activity. Not only do the statutes encourage individuals to report
potential securities law violations to the Securities and Exchange Commission, but
they also encourage individuals to make internal reports to supervisors at the
companies where they work. In fact, as stated above, some of the provisions require
that individuals report internally before they take the information to the
Commission. Theoretically, this would allow the company to fix a problem at the
earliest notice possible.
In light of the public sentiment after the crises in the early 2000s, these statutes
were seen as beneficial not only to the public, but also to the industry. Employees
were now encouraged to blow the whistle on their employers, trying to stop
securities law violations sooner, rather than later in an effort to minimize damages
to stockholders and the general public. The Dodd-Frank Act was passed in 2010 in
part to continue encouraging employees to report wrongdoing that they have
discovered in the course of their employment. The Securities and Exchange
Commission established the Office of the Whistleblower in July of 2010 to provide

Id. at 155.
1s1 Id. at 157 (Jacobs,j., dissenting).
152 Id. at 158.
1so

,20i6-20r7
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funding for the incentive programs created by Dodd-Frank. 1s3 The fund is
provided for by taking a portion of what the Commission recovers from punitive
damages.' Over the past few years, the fund has paid out more than fifty million
dollars to whistleblowers.1 5 5
Whistleblowers serve an essential function-they keep fraudulent activity at bay
in order to ensure there is never another Enron disaster. Transparency in the
system needs to be encouraged through the Securities and Exchange Committee
and its programs.
CONCLUSION

In the coming years, it is likely that the Supreme Court will take this matter
into consideration and resolve the dispute among the circuits. Furthermore, it is
likely that circuits will continue to make decisions with regard to the interpretation
of the statute, aligning with either the Fifth Circuit or the Second Circuit.
Based on the policy implications behind the statute, the circuit courts, as well as
the Supreme Court, should side with Berman and hold that an individual need
report the potential securities law violations only internally to the company he or
she works for in order to be afforded the protections of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. A court in this situation can
hang its hat on the example of Robinson, applying its extension of the definition of
"employee" to the definition of "whistleblower."
The courts may also focus on the policy arguments behind the Dodd-Frank
Act's anti-retaliation provisions. One of the main goals of the Dodd-Frank Act is
to encourage those who have information to come forward and reveal the
wrongdoings that they have discovered. Without the anti-retaliation protections, it
is unlikely that the trend toward reporting will continue because employees will be
scared of being demoted, or worse, losing their jobs.
The financial industry, its shareholders, and employees need the protections
afforded to whistleblowers to be as expansive as possible. In order to prevent
another Enron fiasco, wrongdoings need to be brought to light at the first possible
opportunity. Employees need to know that they may feel confident in their legal
protections with regard to whistleblowing. Because of this, and because the statute
is reasonably ambiguous, deference should be given to the SEC, and the DoddFrank and Sarbanes-Oxley protections should be considered inclusive of those
individuals who report only internally.
153
Offce
of the
Whistlebiower: Frequently Asked
Questions,
SEC.GOV,
https-//www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/owb-faq.shtml [https://perma.cc/Z3CZ-42UH] (last visited
Nov. 11, 2016).
154
Id.
's Dallas Hammer & Jason Zuckerman, Taking Stock of the Success of Dodd-Frank's
21,
2015),
(July
PROJECT
ACCOUNTABILITY
Whistleblower Provisions, Govr
https://www.whistleblower.org/blog/125021-taking-stock-success-dodd-frank's-whisdeblowerprovisions [https://perma.cc/BV64-NA6Q].
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1962, New York University
ROBERT G. LAWSON, Professor of Law (Emeritus 2015). BS 1960, Berea College; JD 1963,
University of Kentucky
THOMAS P. LEWIS, Professor of Law (Emeritus 1997). BA 1954, LLB 1959, University of
Kentucky-, SJD 1964, Harvard University

JOHN M. ROGERS, Judge, US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Thomas P. Lewis Professor

of Law (Emeritus 2002). BA 1970, Stanford University-, JD 1974, University of Michigan
STEPHENJ. VASEKJR., Associate Professor of Law (Emeritus 2012). BS, BA 1961,JD 1966,
Northwestern University; LLM 1969, Harvard University
RICHARD A. WESTIN, Professor of Law (Emeritus 2015). BA 1967, MBA 1968, Columbia

University- JD 1972, University of Pennsylvania
FACULTY
ALBERTINA ANTOGNINI, Assistant Professor of Law. BA 2004, Stanford University; JD 2008,

Harvard University
RICHARD C. AUSNESS, Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Everett H. Metcalf, Jr. Professor
of Law. BA 1966, JD 1968, University of Florida; LLM 1973, Yale University
SCOTT BAURIES, Robert G. Lawson Associate Professor of Law. BA 1995, University of West
Florida; MEd 2001, University of South Florida; JD 2005, PhD 2008, University of Florida
JENN[FER BIRD-POLAN, James and Mary Lassiter Associate Professor of Law. BA 1999, Penn

State University-, JD 2007, Harvard University; MA. 2012, Vanderbilt University
CHRISTOPHER G. BRADLEY, Assistant Professor of Law. AB 2001, Princeton University; MPhil

2003, University of Oxford; JD 2007, New York University School of Law, LLM 2008, New
York University School of Law DPhil 2008, University of Oxford
TINA BROOKS, Electronic Services Librarian. BA 2005, University of Northern
University of Nebraska College of Law, MS 2011, University of Texas

Iowa;JD 2009,

ZACHARY A. BRAY, H. Wendell Cherry Associate Professor of Law-, BA 2001, University of Notre

Dame; JD 2005, Yale Law School
RUTHEFORD B. CAMPBELL, JR., Spears-Gilbert Professor of Law. BA 1966, Centre College; JD

1969, University of Kentucky; LLM 1971, Harvard University
MARIANNAJACKSON CLAY, Visiting Professor of Law. BA 1975; JD 1978, University of

Kentucky
ALLISON CONNELLY, Director of the UK Legal Clinic and James and Mary Lassiter Professor of
Law. BA 1980, JD 1983, University of Kentucky
MARYJ. DAVIS, Stites & Harbison Professor of Law. BA 1979, University of Virginia; JD 1985,
Wake Forest University
JAMES M. DONOVAN, Law Library Director and James and Mary Lassiter Associate Professor of

Law. BA 1981, University of Tennessee at Chattanooga; MLIS 1989, Louisiana State
University; PhD 1994, Tulane University-, MA 2000, Louisiana State University- JD 2003,
Loyola New Orleans School of Law
JOSHUA A. DOUGLAS, Robert G. Lawson & William H. Fortune Associate Professor of Law. BA
2002; JD 2007, George Washington University
CHRISTOPHERW. FROST, Thomas P. Lewis Professor of Law. BBA 1983; JD 1986, University of
Kentucky

BRYAN L. FRYE, Assistant Professor of Law. B.A. 1995, University of California, Berkeley,
M.FA 1997, San Francisco Art Institute; JD 2005, New York University
EUGENE R. GAETKE, Edward T. Breathitt Professor of Law. BA 1971; JD 1974, University of

Minnesota
MARY LOUISE EVERETI' GRAHAM, Senator Wendell H. Ford Professor of Law. BA 1965, JD

1977, University of Texas
JANE GRISE, Director of Academic Success and Professor of Legal Writing. BA; JD 1973,
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN
ROBERTAM. HARDING, Professor of Law. BS 1981, University of San Francisco; JD 1986,

Harvard University
KRISTIN J. HAZELWOOD, Assistant Professor of Legal Research and Writing. BA 1996, University

of Louisville; JD 1999, Washington and Lee University
MICHAEL P. HEALY, Senator Wendell H. Ford Professor of Law. BA 1978, Williams College; JD

1984, University of Pennsylvania
MARK F. KIGHTLINGER, Edward T. Breathitt Associate Professor of Law. BA 1981, Williams

College; JD 1988, Yale Law School
AMELIA LANDENBERGER, Outreach Librarian. BA 2010, Case Western Reserve University-, JD

2013, The Ohio State University-, MLIS 2014, Kent State University
CORTNEY E. LOLLAR, Assistant Professor of Law. BA 1997, Brown University, JD 2002 New

York Univerisity
LESLIE M. MACRAE, Visiting Professor of Law. JD 1973, Baylor Law School; LLM 1977,

University of Miami School of Law, LLM 1983, Temple University Beasley School of Law
DOUGLAS MICHAEL, Stites & Harbison Professor of Law. AB 1979, Stanford University; MBA

1982, JD 1983, University of California
KATHYRN L. MOORE, Ashland-Spears Distinguished Research Professor of Law. AB 1983,

University of Michigan; JD 1988, Cornell University
MICHAEL D. MURRAY, Visiting Professor of Legal Research and Writing. Grad. Cert. 1986,

Fudan University, Shanghai, China; BA 1987, Loyola University Maryland;
Columbia University Law School

JD 1990,

KAREN A. NUCKOLLS, Head of Technical Services. MSLS 1974, Wayne State University, MA

1985, Eastern Michigan University.
MELYNDAJ. PRICE, Robert E. Harding, Jr. Professor of Law. BS 1995, Prairie View A & M

University-, JD 2002, University of Texas; PhD 2006, University of Michigan
FRANKLIN L. RUNGE, Faculty Services Librarian. BA 2000, Hiram College;

JD 2003,

Northeastern University of Law-, MLS 2010, Indiana University
PAUL E. SALAMANCA, Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs Professor of Law. AB 1983, Dartmouth College;
JD 1989, Boston College
ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, Ashland-Spears Distinguished Research Professor of Law and William L.

Matthews, Jr. Professor of Law. BA 1967, Amherst College; J) 1970, Harvard University

BEAU STEENKEN, Instructional Services Librarian. BA 2000, University of Texas at Austin; JD
2003, University of Texas School of Law, LLM 2003, University of Nottingham, United
Kingdom; MS 2008, Texas State University-San Marcos; MSIS 2010, University of Texas
School of Information
RICHARD H. UNDERWOOD, William L. Matthews, Jr. Professor of Law. BA 1969; JD 1976, The
Ohio State University
HAROLD R. WEINBERG, Everett H. Metcalf, Jr. Professor of Law. AB 1966; JD 1969, Case
Western Reserve University, LLM 1975, University of Illinois
SARAH N. WELLING, Ashland-Spears Distinguished Research Professor of Law and Laramie L.
Leatherman Professor of Law. BA 1974, University of Wisconsin; JD 1978, University of Kentucky
ANDREW K. WOODS, Assistant Professor of Law. AB 2002, Brown University; JD 2007, Harvard
University- PhD 2012, University of Cambridge

ADJUNCT FACULTY
GLEN S. BAGBY, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1966, Transylvania University, JD 1969,
University of Kentucky. Firm: Dinsmore & Shohl
FRANK T. BECKER, Adjunct Professor of Law. JD 1979, University of Kentucky. Equine and
Commercial Law and Litigaiton Practitioner
DON P. CETRULO, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1971, Morehead State University, JD 1974,
University of Kentucky. Firm: Knox & Cetrulo
JENNIFER COFFMAN, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1969, JD 1978, University of Kentucky.
Retired Chief Judge of the Eastern District of Kentucky
REBECCA DILORETO, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1981, Amherst College; JD 1985, University
of Kentucky. Children's Law Center
ANDREW DORISIO, Adjunct Professor of Law. BS 1980, West Virginia University-,JD 1996,
University of Kentucky. Firm: King & Schickli
CHARLES FASSLER, Adjunct Professor of Law. BS 1967, Brooklyn College; JD 1970, University of
Wisconsin Law School; LLM 1974, New York University School of Law
&

WILLIAM GARMER, Adjunct Professor of Law. JD 1975, University of Kentucky. Firm: Garmer

Prather PLLC.
JANET GRAHAM, Adjunct Professor of Law. BS 1987, Virginia Tech University-, JD 1991,
University of Kentucky College of Law. Commissioner of Law, Lexington-Fayette Urban
County Government

KAREN GREENWELL, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1976, JD 1985, University of Kentucky.
Firm: Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs
PIERCE W. HAMBLIN, Adjunct Professor of Law. BBA 1973, JD 1977, University of Kentucky.
Firm: Landrum & Shouse
JAMES G. HARRALSON, Adjunct Professor of Law. JD 1979, University of Kentucky. Retired
Associate General Counsle for AT&T Mobility

JOHN HAYS, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1985, Princeton University-, JD 1988, University of

Kentucky. Firm: Jackson Kelly
G. EDWARD HENRY II, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1976, JD 1979, University of Kentucky.
Firm: Henry, Watz, Raine & Marino
GAYLE W. HERNDON, Adjunct Professor of Law. JD 1982, University of Kentucky. Retired Tax

Counsel for Tax Policy and Planning at the General Electric Company
PAULA HOLBROOK, Adjunct Professor of Law. BS 1990, JD 1993, University of Kentucky. UK
HealthCare
GUION JOHNSTONE, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 2005, Transylvania University MSW 2011,
JD 2011, University of Louisville. Director of Maxwell Street Legal Clinic
EMILYJONES, Adjunct Professor of Law. JD 2011, University of Kentucky. Immigration Attorney

at Kentucy Refugee Ministries
RAYMOND M. LARSON, Adjunct Professor of Law. JD 1970, University of Kentucky. Fayette

County Commonwealth Attorney
JOHN T. MCGARVEY, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1970, JD 1973, University of Kentucky. Firm:

Morgan & Pottinger
GEORGE MILLER, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1975, AM 1978, Brown University, PhD 1981,

Brown University-, JD 1984, University of Kentucky. Firm: Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs
MARGARET PISACANO, Adjunct Professor of Law. BSN 1980, Vanderbilt; JD 1983, University of

Kentucky. Associate General Counsel and Director of Risk Management at University of
Kentucky's Chandler Medical Center
DAMON PRESTON, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1991, Transylvania University, JD 1994,
Harvard. Deputy Public Advocate
STEVEN ROUSE, Adjunct Professor of Law. AB 1999, University of Illinois; JD 2006,

Northwestern University
THALETIA ROUTr, Adjunct Professor of Law. JD 2000, University of Kentucky. Associate

General Counsel for University of Kentucky
THOMAS E. RUTLEDGE, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1985, St. Louis University, JD 1990,

University of Kentucky. Firm: Stoll Keenon Ogden
JOE SAVAGE, Adjunct Professor of Law. JD 1964, University of Kentucky
LINDA SMITH, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1997, Transylvania University-, JD 1994, Northern

Kentucky Salmon P. Chase College of Law
LARRY SYKES, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1975, Vanderbilt University-, JD 1983, University of
Kentucky. Firm: Stoll Keenon Ogden
WILLIAM THRO, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1986, Hanover College; MA 1988, University of
Melbourne (Australia); JD 1990, University of Virginia School of Law
M. LEE TURPIN, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1997, Transylvania University-, JD 1992,
University of Kentucky College of Law. First Assistant County Attorney

ANDREA WELKER, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1997, Transylvania University, JD 2009,

University of Kentucky College of Law
CHARLES WISDOM, Adjunct Professor of Law. JD 1985, University of Louisville. Chief, Appellate
Section, US Attorney's Office
JEFFREY YOST, Adjunct Professor of Law. JD 1972, West Virginia University, LLM. 1979

Georgetown University. Firm: Jackson Kelly PLLC

